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Zusammenfassung 
Am 5. Mai 2014 trafen sich ExpertInnen aus den WEP 5 Ländern im Rahmen eines Workshops am 
Österreichischen Institut für Internationale Politik, um gemeinsam über den Status und die Zukunft 
der NATO-Partnerschaften zu reflektieren. Im Zentrum standen hierbei die Strategien, Präferenzen 
und Erwartungen von Österreich, Finnland, Irland, Schweden und der Schweiz. Berücksichtigt und 
analysiert wurden auch der regionale wie globale Kontext, vor allem die aktuelle Lage in der Ukraine 
und die möglichen Konsequenzen für die NATO-Russland-Beziehungen. Dieses Papier gibt die Inhalte 
dieser Diskussionen wieder, ohne dabei offen zu legen, welche Informationen und Argumente von 
welcher TeilnehmerIn stammen. 
 
 
Abstract  
On May 5th, 2014, experts from the WEP 5 countries and NATO met at the Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs in order to discuss  NATO’s partnerships in general as well as the related policies, 
expectations, and preferences of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland in particular. The 
discussion, of course, also reflected on the broader strategic context while giving special 
consideration to the potential implications of the crisis in Ukraine and the consequential 
deterioration of relations with Russia. This report summarizes these discussions without making any 
explicit attributions to individual speakers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This event was co-sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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Preface 
On September 26-27, 2013, academics and other experts from a number of neutral and non-aligned 
European countries (namely from Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland) gathered 
at NATO Headquarters in Brussels for a briefing by senior NATO officials and subsequent discussions 
on the future of the Alliance’s partnerships. The Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip) and 
the Advisory Board to the Scientific Committee of the Austrian Armed Forces organized a follow-up 
event – held in Vienna, Austria, on May 5, 2014 – in an effort to bring the same experts together 
again and provide an additional platform to jointly reflect on what was presented in Brussels, outline 
the related positions and expectations of the countries aforementioned, and discuss relevant topics. 
This seemed to be both necessary and legitimate as “partnership” is an inclusive term, or otherwise 
put, as it takes two to partner and any adaptation or transformation process should also rest on an 
inclusive approach taking account of the needs, visions, expectations, and ideas of partners. 
Accordingly, along with an assessment and analysis of the status quo of NATO’s partnership portfolio 
and of the broader regional and global strategic context and next to an identification and listing of 
the challenges and risks NATO and its partners are confronted with and will have to cope with or 
respond to in the foreseeable future, the workshop participants provided information on the policies, 
priorities and preferences of their countries of origin. Moreover, both the debate as well as its timing 
seemed to be more than adequate as the year 2014 marks the 20th anniversary of the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program. 
 
Except for Malta, experts from the countries mentioned above (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
Switzerland) participated in this workshop alongside a staff-member from NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division. This paper summarizes the statements given by the workshop participants (see list on next 
page) and ensuing discussions without disclosing who said what and making any explicit attributions. 
Please also note that all speakers participated in the workshop in a personal capacity and expressed 
exclusively their personal views and assessments. Moreover, as this paper incorporates all the 
different views expressed, a participant will unlikely endorse all arguments to be found herein.  
 
At this point, we wish to thank all workshop participants for their statements and contributions to 
the discussions. Special thanks are also due to the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO, which co-
sponsored and lent support to the organization of this event. We would also like to thank our entire 
team for its support and collective team-work that led to this event taking place.  
NATO’s Partnerships – Quo Vadis?       Austrian Institute for International Affairs - oiip 
 
 
4 
 
List of Participants 
 
Name Institution Country 
Heinz Gärtner oiip Austria 
Hakan Akbulut oiip Austria 
Irina Iancu oiip Austria 
Lawrence Kettle oiip Austria 
Amb. Karl Schramek 
Head of the Austrian Mission to 
NATO and Ambassador to Belgium Austria 
Karin Fichtinger-Grohe Austrian Foreign Ministry Austria 
Barbora Maronkova Public Diplomacy Division  NATO 
Walter Feichtinger Austrian Ministry of Defense Austria 
Wolfgang Manzl Austrian Ministry of Defense Austria 
Erich Riedl Austrian Ministry of Defense Austria 
Kari Möttölä University of Helsinki Finland 
Terhi Suominen Atlantic Council of Finland Finland 
Andrew Cottey University College Cork Ireland 
Lena Bartholdson Society of Defence, Sweden Sweden 
Stefan Ollson Stockholm Free World Forum Sweden 
Christian Nünlist ETH Zürich Switzerland 
 
  
NATO’s Partnerships – Quo Vadis?       Austrian Institute for International Affairs - oiip 
 
 
5 
 
Introduction 
NATO did not only outlast the Cold War but also proved those wrong who claimed its years were 
numbered as its raison d’ètre had ceased to exist when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Iron 
Curtain fell. Rather than disappearing from the scene or sinking into irrelevance, NATO has 
successfully transformed itself in response to a changing regional and global context. 
Correspondingly, NATO’s past twenty years were characterized by flexibility and adaptability. The 
Alliance did not only expand its mission portfolio and extend its operational radius beyond Europe, 
but with this it also drew on an enlarged membership and a web of partnerships spanning large parts 
of the globe. Accordingly, NATO counts as of today 41 partner countries alongside a number of 
international organizations such as the EU, UN, or OSCE, with whom it has been cooperating with.  
 
Overall, partnerships have been a central element of cooperative security and effective crisis 
management in and beyond Europe. However, this is not to say that there has been one single 
partnership model being applied to all interested countries. To the contrary, NATO has been 
partnering with countries of different political making, having different security needs and different 
means at their disposal, favouring different levels of engagement with the Alliance, and thus making 
different contributions to the goals of the Alliance and asking for different returns alongside varying 
allied prioritizations of issues, regions and countries. As an example, one should look at the Europe 
bound Partnership for Peace (PfP) that has also served to prepare many countries for membership, 
the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) reaching out to the 
countries of the MENA region, or the partners across the globe including countries such as Japan 
South Korea, Australia, the Philippines or Thailand, but also India, Vietnam, Indonesia or Pakistan. 
 
As NATO and partner countries face a number of new challenges today, the need to adapt to 
changing circumstances seems to be of an enduring character and transformative capacity an all-
time requirement. First, having fielded many operations, with the end of the ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan, NATO’s status will change “from deployed to prepared” as the Secretary General, 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, put it. These operations did not only give birth to partnerships between 
NATO and many countries in the first instance, they have also necessitated a certain level of steady 
consultation, coordination and cooperation. With NATO changing to a “non-deployed” or “stand-by” 
mode, the task will, first and foremost, be to preserve the ties established and “conserve” the 
achievements made (including, among others, the lessons-learned, levels of interoperability 
achieved, or common visions and convergences generated in different issue areas). Above that, 
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however, the Alliance will need to create opportunities for “peace time” exchanges, coordination 
and cooperation. To put it in other words, NATO will have to find a creative formula to avert an 
“erosion” of the partnerships created. At the same time, given the abovementioned variety of 
partner profiles and different fora for engaging various countries in different forms, and 
notwithstanding efforts taken so far (especially the Berlin Package of 2011), NATO is still confronted 
with expectations  from some members, partners and external observers to streamline or overhaul 
existing partnership formats, define principles for prioritizing certain partners over others, and 
pronounce related costs and benefits of belonging to one category or another. When working to 
adapt NATO and its partnerships to the post-Afghanistan period, all involved parties will also need to 
give credit to the potential implications of, for instance, the reality of shrinking defence budgets in 
Europe and the US (while, for example, Russian or Chinese defence expenditures have been rising 
continuously), of the US pivot to Asia, of the volatility of the situation in the MENA region, and the 
need to pursue a comprehensive approach when tackling eventual crises. It goes without saying that 
any crisis can erupt anywhere unexpectedly; with the recent crisis in Ukraine constituting a case in 
point, which also redirected attention to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and collective defence. 
Apart from such crises and tensions with specific countries, among others, risks and challenges 
associated with cyber security, energy security, piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, climate change, 
and disaster relief, will continue to bear on efforts to adapt and transform NATO’s partnerships.  
 
Summarizing what was mainly discussed during  the workshop titled “NATO’s Partnerships: Quo 
Vadis?” held in Vienna on 5 May, 2014, this paper looks into the past and potential future of 
partnerships giving special consideration to the experiences and preferences of neutral or non-
aligned European countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland)  that have been engaging 
with NATO at varying degrees.  
NATO’s Partnerships – Experiences, Opportunities and Challenges 
 
NATO’s partnership policy has evolved and transformed over a period of twenty years. In fact, when 
the Alliance’s partnership program was kicked off a short time after the end of the Cold War, 
uncertainties loomed over the entire project which was being questioned by many sceptics. How 
would, for instance, Russia react and where would this partnerships lead to? Would PfP be the path 
to membership or would it rather be a substitute for joining the Alliance?  It took even NATO some 
years to realize that the partnerships constituted much more than simply providing assistance in 
security sector reform and alike. As the 2010 strategic concept defined cooperative security as a core 
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task of the Alliance alongside collective defence and crisis management, the significance of the 
partnership policy became even more apparent.  
 
Partnerships build on shared interests and mutual benefits. The partners have been able to decide to 
what extent they would engage with the Alliance. While some Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries viewed PfP as a stepping stone and preparation for membership, other states simply 
regarded it as a pragmatic framework for cooperation, including in crisis management. Creating and 
sustaining interoperability has undoubtedly been one of the key benefits associated with 
partnerships. It also goes without saying that the partnership framework has allowed for dialogue 
and consultations on challenges and threats to security. PfP also served as a model for partnerships 
with countries located in other parts of the world within the framework of the Mediterranean 
Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Overall, NATO’s partnership policy has been 
allowing countries of a different political making, different values and interests, from different parts 
of the world to engage with the Alliance without contradicting national security and foreign policy 
interests and at varying degrees.  
 
At the same time, it has not only been partner countries profiting from cooperation with NATO but 
also vice versa. Past and present NATO operations have shown, especially those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, that a comprehensive approach including civilian elements is needed and NATO cannot 
go it alone; neither in political nor in military terms. Yet, beyond contributions to crisis management 
and post-conflict nation-building, the participation of partners changes the way in which NATO 
operations are perceived and evaluated by external observers. For instance, the participation of 
Sweden in the operation in Libya completely changed the quality and nature of this undertaking and 
consequently the perception thereof, which facilitated contributions from other countries such as 
Morocco, Qatar or Jordan.1  
 
With NATO’s partnership portfolio growing and expanding to different parts of the world, the 
question also arose on how to reform the Alliance partnership policy and bring all these different 
partners under one umbrella. The meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin in 2011 thus approved a new 
policy, which was intended to create a new momentum and allow for a better engagement of 
partners creating new tools and new formats for meetings. However, the Berlin policy did not work 
                                                          
1
 A similar situation could be observed during the EU operation in Chad. The operation was under Irish 
command while an Austrian commander was in charge of the special forces. This helped to signal that this was 
not a French undertaking.  
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out as smoothly as expected and opening up all activities (training, education and cooperation 
menus) to all partners did not create the intended effect as each partner has particular interests and 
particular relations with other allies. It became obvious that an alternative strategy was necessary. 
The Western European partners (WEP) played a crucial role in this context. The so-called “tiger 
teams” – comprising at least one member-state and a partner country – were created in an effort to 
bring up issues from the bottom up and give some substance to debates in partnership fora and 
revitalize them as such. At the same time, the tiger team concept reflected a change in 
understandings underlying the partnerships policy: While NATO would previously reach out to 
partners and see who wanted to participate in predefined operations, exercises or other forms of 
cooperation, with the tiger teams emerging, some partners would start bringing their policies to 
NATO and try to make the Alliance adopt what was relevant from their point of view. For instance, 
the Swiss pushed the topic of Private Security Companies within NATO. This ended up as a NATO 
policy and the Alliance subscribed to the Montreux Document. In a similar fashion, Sweden initiated 
discussions on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This led to the 
instalment of a special adviser on the topic, which will become a permanent position within NATO’s 
international secretariat. Austria, as another Western European partner, has facilitated discussions 
on the topic of POC, that is the Protection of Civilians. This is in sharp contrast to initial policies and 
practices, when partner even had no guarantee of being invited to relevant meetings in spite of their 
contributions to NATO operations. This was, for instance, the case in Kosovo where partners “had to 
push for inclusion in meetings” and were side-lined “whenever possible”. NATO did also previously 
hardly ever react to proposals tabled by partners. So, many “letters the WEP 5 [Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland] sent NATO remained unanswered”. This is all illustrative of the 
learning process that both NATO and the partners have undergone as well as of the transformation 
of the nature of this relationship.  
 
The Alliance and its partners face a number of challenges and uncertainties today. To begin with, 
NATO’s operation in Afghanistan - unquestionably the most challenging and biggest NATO operation 
to date - will end in 2014. Even though the end of ISAF will not mark the end of NATO operations as 
such given the fact that the operation in Kosovo will continue, the question arises as to how NATO 
will manage to stay connected with partner countries after 2014, especially with those that did not 
engage with the Alliance prior to ISAF. Thinking ahead, partnerships will overall have to focus on 
three main topics: First, on the question of interoperability, which all sides have been profiting from, 
both NATO and the partners. The connected forces initiative, the framework nation concept and joint 
training activities in general will help to uphold and secure interoperability even after ISAF has come 
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to an end. The second issue of concern will be capacity building. However, this is something that has 
been practiced in the past twenty years and does not constitute anything new given security and 
defence sector reform work in many countries. For instance, Austria has extensively contributed to 
this. The question will be how related knowledge can be transferred to countries in other regions 
such as Africa (as this was already done in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan). Thirdly, what will be 
relevant with respect to partners in distant parts of the globe will be to uphold political connectivity. 
Australia, for instance, has participated in ISAF and it is most likely that Australian officers will attend 
the NATO Defence College or participate in training. However, the challenge will be to uphold higher 
level political dialogue after ISAF. With regard to WEP, there are a great number of projects and 
common interests that will guarantee continued political and military connectivity even after 2014. 
Nonetheless, participation in NATO operations has been the most central and significant form of 
engagement with the Alliance. Thus, once these operations have been completed, this will come to 
bear on NATO-WEP 5 relations, too, as a core area of cooperation will have disappeared.  
Nonetheless, the major task will still be to identify substantial issues and activities to continue high 
level dialogue with distant partners. In fact, global partners such as Australia or Japan have been 
among the most active ones alongside the WEP 5 while the CEE countries which had also performed 
actively as partners joined NATO at some point. Therefore, while NATO has indeed established 
partnerships with a broad range of countries all around the globe, the range of “active partners” 
seems to be rather limited.  
 
What seems to constitute a more pressing issue is the crisis in Ukraine. In the short term, it is 
unquestionably going to leave its imprint on NATO’s next summit in Wales that was initially planned 
to focus on the topic of partnerships. The question will, of course, be how to deal with Russia. For the 
time being, all practical political and military cooperation with the latter has been suspended. 
However, allies’ views diverge on this issue and there is no common position on a strategy to be 
adopted towards Russia, at least not for the time being. Overall, at this stage, it seems to be 
impossible to forecast what the mid and long term impact of the Ukraine crisis will be on NATO’s 
partnership policy and the Alliance as such. Nevertheless, it is most likely going to feed into and fuel 
debates on priority setting within the Alliance. The crisis will most probably bolster calls for 
“returning to traditional values” and giving greater attention to territorial defence and Article V 
rather than focusing on cooperative security and partnerships. This would also mean limiting the 
radius of NATO activity to the European continent and rethinking its global role. On the part of 
partner countries, this might also further differentiation; that is to say some allies might move closer 
to the Alliance while others might continue to prefer lower levels of engagement. All these “divides” 
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among NATO member-states and partners are, of course, not a product of the Ukraine crisis as such 
and have already existed before. They could, however, grow further and thus become more visible 
given the developments in Ukraine. 
 
It is worth reiterating at this point that since the end of the East-West conflict NATO has undergone a 
significant transformation process and became an organization of global reach. The former Secretary 
General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, concluded in 2005 that NATO had to face the challenges “when and 
where they emerge or they will end up on our doorstep”. NATO moved on to crisis management 
operations, even if they were to take place out of NATO’s core area, such as in the Balkans or 
Afghanistan. NATO not only acted “out-of-area” but also “out-of-continent”. Yet, Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer later also stressed that NATO could not act as a “global policeman” because it faced financial 
restrictions and had limited resources. Even though the focus has shifted towards Ukraine, the 
humanitarian crises and natural disasters will not disappear. The need for crisis management, early 
warning, conflict prevention, and post-conflict settlement, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, 
and non-proliferation will remain. Some of the partners have special (niche-) capabilities in early 
warning, preventive deployment, protection of civilians, disaster relief, peace-keeping or post-
conflict reconstruction. Crisis management is a comprehensive task. It involves political, security, 
military, diplomatic, civilian, environmental and humanitarian dimensions. Some of these tasks might 
be better developed by partner than member countries. Moreover, a multiplicity of tasks has to be 
provided by NGO’s through the military, such as water, food, medicine, tents. The “tiger teams” can 
provide a useful basis to prepare these missions. NATO together with partners could enhance the 
global crisis response structure. 
 
Some partner countries might concentrate more on the crisis management pillar of NATO, others 
might want to move closer to membership and collective defense. This also means that within the 
concept of the “framework nations” interoperability has to be tailored for those partners who want 
to be more involved in crisis management operations rather than territorial defense. The military 
capabilities of partners might not be sufficient for every pillar and task. The common basis between 
NATO and partners will remain cooperative security, however. Partners should be further engaged in 
the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Connected Force Initiative (CFI), in command structures for 
special missions, civil-military relations, regional security complexes, counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency (COIN) coordination, education and training cooperation. In the framework of 
cooperative security, partners could through functional cooperation develop together with NATO a 
security community with common values, mutual accountability, intensified communication and 
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information sharing. This requires international coordination standardization and interoperability, 
common education and data exchange. 
 
The crisis in Ukraine might also move some countries to spend more money on military 
procurements despite the financial crisis of recent years. The financial crisis has in fact been another 
big challenge in past years and rendering publics even less willing to accept huge investments in the 
military sector. Whether this tendency will be reversed in the face of tensions with Russia remains to 
be seen. However, the experiences made after the 2008 conflict in Georgia might, offer some hints 
on how things might evolve. There were some minor increases in military spending in some countries 
but no general rush to procure more weapons and equipment.  Hence, it is plausible to assume that 
in today’s case, too, different countries will respond differently and some will probably spend more 
money on defence compared to others. Overall, at this stage, it seems to be inadequate to regard 
the developments in Ukraine as a big “game-changer”.  
 
Financial short-comings might indeed also have a positive side-effect, for they render closer 
cooperation between NATO and the EU indispensable. So far, there has been only limited 
cooperation, especially due to the disputes between NATO member Turkey and EU member-state 
Cyprus. Even though high-level staff talks take place between NATO and organisations such as the UN 
or the OSCE, this is not possible in the case of the EU, which is rather difficult for outside observers to 
conceive. So, even though “more cost-effective work” was a necessity before Ukraine and will 
continue to be so thereafter, unless the Cyprus issue is solved, prospects for closer NATO-EU 
relations will remain dim.  
WEP 5 under Focus 
 
Prior to the PfP, NATO did not have an institutionalized framework for engaging neutral and non-
aligned states and exchanges were very limited, in most cases coming in the form of bilateral defence 
relations between neutral or non-aligned states and a number of NATO countries. However, in the 
post-Cold War era, the PfP has constituted a political fact both for NATO and the neutral and non-
aligned countries. They have been cooperating and implementing joint activities almost on a daily 
basis. What is more, the WEP 5 – that is the countries under consideration in this paper – have been 
among the most active partners. Both shared interests and shared values facilitated such 
engagement and rendered cooperation easier. Given the fact that all these countries are established 
democracies, there was no need for NATO, for instance, to invest in security sector reform, which 
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also left these countries as contributors rather than recipients in the PfP context. They have, for 
example, been contributing to training and defence sector reform in the Balkans and the Baltics.  
  
Just as there is a certain degree of flexibility within NATO and member-countries are engaging to 
varying degrees with the Alliance, the same is true for partners. This has been also the case within 
the group of WEP 5. Sweden and Finland, on the one hand, have been pursuing a maximalist 
approach, that is to say they have been ready to engage to the fullest extent possible with the 
Alliance, yet short of membership. Switzerland and Ireland, on the other hand, have only had limited 
cooperation. Austria has usually been somewhere in-between. In spite of “clear nuances and 
differences in national preferences”, however, the WEP 5 managed to appear as a “coherent group” 
and became to be viewed as such. Such coherence nonetheless has been exposed to added strains 
recently, mainly due to efforts on the part of Sweden and Finland to enhance differentiation and 
move closer to NATO. The Ukraine crisis is likely to further move these two countries closer to the 
Alliance. This could have the adverse effect of undermining the standing and relevance of the WEP 5 
as a whole. It has been these countries performing as a group that has vested them with significance 
and some level of influence within the NATO context. As single countries, they might be rather 
“negligible” for NATO, one line of argumentation goes. The national preferences and policies of 
single WEP 5 countries are briefly outlined below.  
 
Austria 
Two factors mainly shape Austrian policies in the security realm. First, Austria does not face any 
immediate challenges to its security. Second, Austria wishes to contribute to peace and security 
abroad and act as a reliable partner.  When doing so, Austria pursues a ''balanced engagement'', that 
is to say that the country works to contribute to the activities of all relevant international institutions 
(UN, EU, NATO, OSCE).  Notwithstanding this “balanced approach”, Austria, nonetheless, puts special 
emphasis on strengthening the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU for this is the most 
significant security framework for Austria as a non-NATO member. What is more, a UN mandate is a 
prerequisite for Austria’s participation in operations abroad. Another feature of Austrian 
engagement is that the country is rather risk-averse and gives preference to near-by theatres. Hence, 
South East Europe constitutes the region of primary concern and priority for Austria.  
 
Given these preferences, priorities and principles, joining the PfP was only the logical thing to do. PfP 
has constituted a welcome opportunity for Austria to contribute to operations in South East Europe, 
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on the one hand, and, at the same time, to rake in some benefits from its engagement. So, Austria 
has worked alongside allies in security and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
currently has personnel deployed in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Participating in such peacekeeping and 
peace support operations alongside NATO has reinforced Austria's own process of military 
transformation. Participation in the PfP and NATO-led operations facilitated interoperability on the 
basis of NATO standards.  
 
During the late 1990s and shortly after 2001, there were some debates in Austria on whether the 
country should join the Alliance or not. However, these were soon dismissed. The fact remains that 
the population is reluctant when it comes to Austria becoming a fully-fledged NATO member. 
Membership would not be an option, because this would neither entail any additional benefits, 
except for Article V. However, within the current political context and given the fact that Austria does 
not face immediate threats from the exterior, Article V has currently no relevance for Austria.  
 
All in all, Austria wants to maintain its policy of balanced engagement by further contributing to 
peacekeeping and being an active member of the international community.  As mentioned above, 
Austrian troops have been deployed in Kosovo (500), Lebanon (160) and almost 350 in Bosnia. 
Austria also dispatched three officers to Afghanistan to show flag. In recent years, Africa has 
emerged as a new area of concern and operation for Austria. Austria participated in the mission in 
Chad, has been contributing to the mission in Mali, and also raised the issue of sending some troops 
to Central Africa.  
 
As for the question on what activities the partners could engage in in the future, pooling and sharing 
has a huge potential from an Austrian perspective. Even though Austria has “earmarked” 1,100 
troops for operations abroad, this is not seen as a reason to engage in a kind of “mission hunting”. In 
the case that lower numbers are needed, “excess troops” can, for instance, be tasked to train 
conscripts. With regard to the developments in Ukraine, at least for the time being, Austria does not 
consider these events as being a game-changer in the security context.  
 
Finland 
Similar to the case of Sweden, Finland engages with NATO to the fullest possible extent while 
retaining its non-aligned status at the same time. Nevertheless, the political elites do not rule out the 
option of becoming a member even though the current government concurred in 2009 not to take 
any steps in this regard for the time being. This does also not change the fact that when devising 
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Finnish defence policy and related undertakings, precaution is taken to avoid any changes which 
could constitute a barrier to a future accession to NATO. On several occasions, Finnish governments 
have commissioned reports on the possible implications (financial, institutional, etc.) of an eventual 
accession to NATO.  
 
Three major factors have been shaping attitudes and decision-making on the issue of NATO 
membership. In terms of geopolitical thinking, the question has been raised as to whether Finland 
needs and would actually benefit from membership. There seems to exist a common understanding 
that Finland requires a strong defence irrespective of the extent of its engagement with the Alliance. 
Universal conscription and a strong reserve force along with necessary planning and preparations 
serve to guarantee an effective territorial defence. All this raises the confidence of the public that 
there is no need for a change. At the same time, there is a lack of confidence in the reliability of other 
powers coming to Finland’s aid in case need arises – even if Finland were to be become a NATO 
member. What is more, at an ideational level, “neutrality” is deeply ingrained in Finnish identity 
which is being permanently reinforced by the positive historical record. Governance or institutional 
aspects seem to be less controversial. Only a few would oppose the prospect of sitting at the table 
with other democracies and engaging in political consultations.  
 
Public opinion on NATO membership and defence issues has hardly changed over the years. 
According to polls conducted in 2013, 68 percent support universal conscription while only 11 
percent are in favour of all-voluntary defence forces. In terms of military cooperation, 93 percent 
support cooperation with all of the parties, that is the Nordic countries, the EU and NATO. However, 
support for cooperation with the Nordic countries and the EU is rather considerable, in both cases 
well above 80 percent, whereas only 49 percent are in favour of cooperation with NATO. In line with 
this, 70 percent oppose NATO membership while only 21 percent declare their support for accession 
to the Alliance. After the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, the percentage of those in favour of 
membership has only seen an insignificant rise to 22 percent. As the polls indicate, the public 
positively views cooperation with Nordic countries. Concepts such as pooling and sharing or smart 
defence are assessed positively, too. Accordingly, close relations with the US, for instance, in terms 
of military procurements, have never been controversial.  
 
Against this background, Finland has been cooperating with the Alliance to the outmost extent and 
viewing partnership as a useful and valuable tool for achieving interoperability on the basis of NATO 
standards. This feeds into the development of capabilities for both participating in international 
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missions (also in those led by the EU, OSCE or the UN) as well as for fostering national defence 
capabilities. What is more, in spite of public lack of confidence in the credibility of security 
assurances provided by external actors, partnership and cooperation with NATO are also expected to 
raise the likelihood of receiving assistance from the Alliance in case of contingencies. Overall, as 
there has been no need for security sector reform in Finland, the country has been an active 
contributor to Alliance activities. Finland has been contributing to ISAF and KFOR. Moreover, it has 
troops in Lebanon (UN-led) and in Bosnia (EU-led). In fact, Finland currently has more troops in 
Lebanon (350) than in Afghanistan (110); hence, participation in UN-led operations will continue to 
be an option after the operation in Afghanistan comes to an end.  
 
Ireland 
In order to understand the Irish perspective on NATO and partnerships with the Alliance, one needs 
to consider that both topics have very little political salience in Ireland; i.e. there is only little interest 
in both NATO and the partnership with NATO. This is against the background of a very strong public 
commitment to neutrality and anti-militarism. Moreover, there is a peace movement which is 
broadly anti-NATO and also anti-partnerships. Even though this movement is becoming quite vocal in 
Ireland, this does not mean that it necessarily possesses much influence. Beyond that, there are only 
a few academics that might have an interest in NATO-related issues.  
 
Given these public attitudes, the political elites, also have little interest in discussing NATO related 
topics. Nonetheless, at the governmental level, there is, of course, an ongoing discussion about 
NATO and NATO partnerships involving among others the ministry for defence, the foreign ministry 
as well as the armed forces. Drivers for cooperation with NATO can be summarized under three 
headings: First, becoming a NATO partner appeared as something that the European mainstream 
practiced. So, remaining outside the PfP would have meant staying outside the European 
mainstream, which Irish decision-makers wanted to avoid. Secondly, peacekeeping has always been 
such a central element of Irish foreign and security policy to the extent that one could argue it was 
part of Irish national identity. In line with this, it has constituted the major role for Irish defence 
forces. As NATO emerged as the main peacekeeper in the Balkans in the 1990s, Irish decision-makers 
concluded that Ireland had to engage with NATO in order be able to participate in such peacekeeping 
operations. Thirdly, from a perspective of the military forces and the department of defence, NATO is 
“the military gold standard” and “good military professionalism in part implies working to the kind of 
standards and practices that NATO embodies”. Since they view themselves as military professionals, 
engaging with NATO thus seems only logical.  
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Should NATO indeed become “post-interventionist” and refocus on collective defence, this would 
most likely narrow down the political space for Ireland to engage with NATO. The consequence 
would probably not be Ireland completely disengaging from NATO but rather becoming less active. 
Irish decision-makers would try not to be excluded from the elements of partnership, but at the same 
time, worry not to get involved in and bound by anything that might cause political difficulties at 
home.  
 
Sweden 
Sweden has taken part in PfP in an active manner since the program was kicked off. The country has 
contributed to NATO operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. Sweden has also adapted its 
entire defence forces in line with NATO standards, to the extent that Swedish pilots no longer 
communicate in Swedish but English. In 2013, Sweden also made a decision to join the NATO 
Response Force (NRF). So, overall, similar to the case of Finland, Sweden practically engages with the 
Alliance to the fullest possible extent without joining the Alliance. Sweden thus enjoys a good 
standing as an active partner whose contributions in some cases tops that of actual members. In fact, 
Sweden in return expects NATO’s (in particular Denmark’s and Norway’s) assistance in case of any 
contingency despite announcements by the Alliance that Article V only applies to member-states.  
 
Despite all the commonalities, there are also major differences in the security and defence policies of 
Sweden and Finland. Sweden abandoned conscription in 2010 and only has a small professional 
army. At the moment, it could solely fully mobilize a battalion which could only withstand an attack 
for a week at a single theatre. At the same time, this army is supposed to be highly trained, well 
equipped and able to jointly operate with NATO countries. The country’s geographic position and the 
lack of any immediate threat to Swedish security might be the reason for having such a small-scale 
defence force. Since the army is too small to defend the entire Swedish territory, joining NATO could 
constitute a panacea. This is also why many in Sweden’s defense establishment are in favour of 
NATO membership. It was difficult to have a small army and be a non-aligned country at the same 
time, the argument goes. Throughout the Cold War, Sweden had a large, strong and independent 
army, which is no longer the case.  
 
With regards to the public opinion, the situation resembles that in Finland: public opinion remains 
broadly attached to Sweden's military non-alignment. Only around 30 percent are in favour of joining 
the Alliance. The Ukraine crisis even entailed a rise in the number of people opposing NATO 
membership from 45 percent to 50 percent. It is plausible to assume this is due to the historical 
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legacy of being or conceiving oneself as a neutral country. At the same time, it is worth noting that 
while the public is convinced Sweden has always been a neutral country, Swedish governments have 
not been using the term “neutrality” since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the current government 
does not even use the term “non-aligned”. Official policy is, however, summarized as “non-alignment 
while seeking security together with other actors”. The public also seems to be unaware of the 
solidarity clause contained in the Lisbon Treaty which states that EU countries will provide assistance 
to other member-states that face terrorist attacks or natural and man-made disasters.  
 
Just as in Finland, the debate on NATO membership in Sweden will surely go on and developments in 
Ukraine and in Russia's relationship with NATO will continue to be a critical variable to the public 
opinion and policy-making. It is also worth noting that Sweden takes part in air policing in the Baltic 
countries and granted NATO permission to use Swedish airspace for surveillance activities. The 
country, together with Finland, is also exposed to pressure by Baltic nations and Poland to join NATO 
as this would render it easier for the Alliance to defend these countries.  
 
Switzerland 
The developments of the 1990s, especially the Balkan wars and a desire to promote stability via 
cooperation as well as to export values were essential in creating the ground for Switzerland to 
become a NATO-partner. Hence, cooperative security has been the main driver for Swiss 
engagement with NATO. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO has undergone some change and 
fielded operations outside Europe with Afghanistan becoming the site of its most significant 
operation. This did not necessarily overlap with Swiss priorities and preferences for which reason the 
country has also refrained from making any substantial contributions within the framework of ISAF. 
Western Balkans have continued to constitute the area of concern and engagement for Switzerland.  
 
With NATO undergoing change, public attitudes towards the Alliance have also shifted. While around 
28 percent of the Swiss declared a desire to join NATO in the 1990s, this figure declined to 19 percent 
in 2013. 9/11 and ensuing developments overall reinforced neutrality as an element of Swiss identity. 
Around 95 percent of the population perceives neutrality as a good thing that should be preserved. 
Moreover, 81 percent maintain that Switzerland should remain economically and politically 
independent. At the same time, more than 60 percent support the idea of Swiss membership in the 
UN Security Council in about ten years, which indicates that the Swiss people view the UN more 
positively than NATO or the EU.  
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With the current events escalating in Europe and globally, NATO is going through another series of 
changes. This tends to put the Swiss relationship with NATO into a different perspective. A NATO 
refocusing on Europe would indeed be more in line with Swiss preferences, since Switzerland has not 
necessarily been in favour of NATO acting around the globe. There is, however, another observable 
tendency to revitalize collective defence, which is less fortunate from a Swiss perspective and will 
likely entail some debates in the country about neutrality and Switzerland’s role in Europe. In the 
face of the crisis in Ukraine, cooperative security is likely to be devalued. As mentioned above, 
cooperative security has however been central to Swiss desire to engage with the Alliance. A shift of 
balances from cooperative security to collective defence will thus very likely render it more difficult 
for Swiss policymakers to explain why Switzerland should cooperate with NATO. Meanwhile, Swiss 
contributions in Kosovo continue to constitute “the hard core of Swiss engagement with NATO”.   
 
Switzerland has also benefited from cooperation with the Alliance. The military, for instance, has 
greatly profited from Swiss participation in KFOR. Political consultations have been another element 
cherished by Switzerland which would like to see this further strengthened in the future, especially 
on issues of Swiss concern including energy security, non-proliferation, and cyber security among 
others. Given Swiss content with the current level of WEP 5 engagement with the Alliance, 
Switzerland would not view efforts to achieve related upgrades positively. Accordingly, gaps within 
the WEP5 and a potential of them growing further give rise to concerns in Switzerland.  
Conclusion  
 
On May 5th, 2014, experts from the WEP 5 countries and NATO met at the Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs for discussions on NATO’s partnerships in general and the related policies, 
expectations, and preferences of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland in particular. The 
discussion, of course, also reflected on the broader strategic context while giving special 
consideration to the potential implications of the crisis in Ukraine and the consequential 
deterioration of relations with Russia.  
 
NATO’s partnerships have evolved over time and undergone transformation ever since the PfP was 
launched. The direction this process would take on as well as the benefits it would generate were not 
all well understood at the very beginning. Countries have participated in NATO’s partnership 
programs for different reasons and at varying degrees. Notwithstanding the fact that PfP prepared 
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many CEE states for accession to the Alliance, the partnership portfolio has also generated benefits 
for those not seeking membership as well as for NATO. Partnerships have not only created 
opportunities for dialogue and consultations on security topics, but, first and foremost, helped to 
achieve interoperability on the basis of NATO standards. Such interoperability has been further 
developed and practically tested during various NATO operations in and beyond Europe. Accordingly, 
related work has also fed into and assisted the transformation of partner armed forces and has 
benefited cooperation in international missions as such, that is, in non-NATO frameworks. Over time, 
the creation of new frameworks such as the tiger groups has also allowed partner countries to take 
the initiative and propose policies. On the one hand, a desire not to be left out of the European 
mainstream and do what others have been doing or the wish to show flag have also been factors 
motivating engagement with the Alliance. On the other hand, apart from the various contributions 
(troops, materiel, etc.) to NATO operations, the participation of non-members including neutral and 
non-aligned countries has allowed such missions to be conceived and perceived more positively, 
which also allowed further countries to participate.  
 
Conserving all these assets once NATO’s operations have been concluded constitutes one of the 
challenges both the Alliance and the partners face. The parties will have to work to uphold 
interoperability and continue high- level political dialogue. This will, most likely, be less a challenge in 
the case of “near-by” partners and those that have been participating in a broad variety of NATO 
activities. It is also worth reminding that those partners that have not participated actively in NATO’s 
programs so far might anyway be interested in preserving the same low level of engagement. 
 
Further challenges to be considered are the financial crisis as well as the deterioration of relations 
with Russia given developments in Ukraine. While budget constraints might give impetus to the 
pooling and sharing of military assets and force NATO and the EU to expand cooperation, the crisis in 
Ukraine, at the same time, might induce additional defence spending in spite of budgetary effects. 
Further implications of the Ukraine crisis might be NATO further downgrading its global engagement, 
refocusing on Europe, and especially reemphasizing collective defense and Article V.  
 
So far, recent developments have not had a tangible impact on public attitudes towards NATO in the 
countries under consideration. In fact, NATO membership is obviously no option for Austria, Ireland, 
and Switzerland – both for the public as well as for decision-makers. While neutrality is also deeply 
ingrained in the collective memories and identity of publics in Finland and Sweden, the defence 
establishments in the two countries do not rule out this option for the future. Correspondingly, their 
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preference has so far been to cooperate with NATO to the fullest possible extent short of 
membership. Thus, despite forming a group that displays some degree of coherence, the 
differentiation between these two countries, on the one side, and Austria, Ireland and Switzerland, 
on the other side, is likely to grow. What is more, even though having no legal or formal basis, the 
assumption of an implied commitment of NATO to their territorial defence seems to play into Finnish 
and Swedish engagement with the Alliance.  
 
In a post-interventionist era, countries such as Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland will most likely find 
fewer opportunities for cooperation with the Alliance. A further deterioration of relations with Russia 
alongside more belligerent attitudes and practices on both sides is also likely to negatively impact 
public opinion on cooperation with NATO in these countries. However, this is not to say that 
cooperation will cease or that the partnership will be abandoned given abovementioned benefits and 
interests.  
 
Overall, it is plausible to assume that the broader strategic context will define the prospects and 
relevance of NATO’s partnerships. The Alliance is unlikely to abandon cooperative security and crisis 
management as core tasks. It is also worth considering that they cannot be wholly separated from 
each other and are interrelated. However, if current trends continue, the balance is likely to shift to 
collective defence leaving less time, energy and assets available for the other two tasks, which will 
ultimately come to bear on the partnerships.   
 
 
 
 
